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At present, the activity of justifying oneself is mostly discussed in 
psychology, where it is typically viewed as a negative or at least 
regrettable activity involving changing one’s attitudes, beliefs, and 
feelings in order to minimize psychological threats arising from 
cognitive dissonance. Yet there is conceptual space, even a need, 
for an analysis of justifying oneself that is more content-neutral in 
nature. In this paper I provide such an analysis. Along the way I 
also briefly canvass some of the empirical work on self-
justification in psychology and gesture towards issues surrounding 
the normative significance of the practice of justifying oneself. !
Keywords: justification, self-justification, self-defense, 
commitment, internal justification, external justification, 
dialectical interaction !!!
1.Introduction !
We attempt to justify ourselves constantly. Sometimes we do this 
casually, sometimes earnestly, sometimes desperately. We justify 
ourselves in response to others’ challenges to our commitments and in the 
face of our own self-doubts. From moral exemplars to ordinary folks to 
flagellants, everyone feels the need to justify themselves in one way or 
another, perhaps more often than we would think. Justifying oneself is an 
ineliminable, important, even dominating feature of our lives. 
But what exactly is involved in engaging in the act of justifying oneself? 
Note that this question is distinct from the exhaustively discussed 
epistemological question of what constitutes a good justification for a 
claim. The epistemological question is fundamentally normative; it 
concerns how justification ought to be done if one wishes to establish 
some kind of claim. My concern is to provide a descriptive conceptual  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analysis of the act of justifying oneself, which may or may not satisfy 
epistemic ideals. Note also that my concern is separate from 
epistemological inquiries into statements, propositions, or beliefs that are 
said to be self-justifying in the sense of possessing epistemic warrant 
without reliance on further statements, propositions, or beliefs serving as 
justificatory supports. By contrast, my interest is in providing an account 
of the activity of attempting to justify oneself. My analysis is thus much 
closer to work in moral psychology than epistemology.  1
At present, the activity of justifying oneself is mostly discussed in 
psychology, where it is typically viewed as a negative or at least 
regrettable activity involving changing one’s attitudes, beliefs, and 
feelings in order to minimize psychological threats arising from cognitive 
dissonance (Burkley and Blanton 2005).  Yet there is conceptual space, 2
even a need, for a conception of justifying oneself that is more content-
neutral in nature. Providing such an analysis could also be useful by 
clarifying its likely effects, and thereby facilitating insights regarding 
whether possessing a robust habit of justifying oneself tends to be 
productive of more benefit or harm. Although defending a normative 
judgment on that score would render my work more compelling in terms 
of practical relevance, my aspirations here are considerably more modest. 
I seek only to provide a theoretical analysis of the practice of justifying 
oneself, a practice with which we are all familiar from our daily lives. 
Along the way I briefly canvass some of the empirical work on self-
justification in psychology, and I gesture towards issues surrounding the 
normative significance of justifying oneself, but my primary aim is to 
explore its conceptual contours. My hope is to provide an analysis that 
can be useful in relation to a variety of further theoretical and normative 
inquiries relating to this important and ubiquitous activity. !
2. Empirical studies !
The psychological literature is fairly united in holding the act of 
justifying oneself to be a negative or unfortunate activity.  This may  3
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simply be entailed by the particular conceptions employed by 
psychologists, but their findings are worth mentioning insofar as they 
provide background for the present study and indicate the predominantly 
negative view amongst scholars working on the topic. 
A 2008 study suggests that there is an important correlation between 
providing a self-serving justification and stretching the truth (Mazar, 
Amir, and Ariely 2008). Another study supports the claim that the 
prevalence of justifying oneself, understood as making excuses for 
negatively viewed behavior, is negatively correlated with self-esteem: the 
more self-esteem one possesses, the less likely one is to engage in 
justifying onself, and vice versa (Holland, Meertens, and van Vugt 2002). 
Jonathan Lowell has argued that acts of self-justification induced by 
cognitive dissonance can create “an amplifying feedback loop and 
downward spiral of immoral behavior” amongst business managers 
(Lowell 2012, 17). A 2014 study claims that processes of justifying 
oneself contribute to failures in self-regulation or autonomy (de Witt 
Huberts, Evers, and de Ridder 2014). According to a more recent study, 
increased self-justification by perpetrators of sexual aggression is a 
significant predictor of further sexual aggression over a one-year follow-
up period (Wegner, Abbey, Pierce, Pegram, and Woerner 2015; see also 
Scully and Marolla 1984).  Another recent study argues that justifying 4
oneself before and after intentional ethical violations tends to enable 
people to do wrong while feeling moral (Shalvi, Gino, Barkan, and Ayal 
2015).  5
Not all psychologists think that justifying oneself, understood here as the 
giving of excuses for one’s behavior, is always a bad thing. C.R. Snyder 
and R.L. Higgins, for example, have argued that this activity can have 
benefits insofar as it conduces to more successful reality negotiation 
(Snyder and Higgins 1988). See also Kivetz and Zheng 2006. 
The last citations notwithstanding, most psychologists seem to view 
justifying oneself as a regrettable activity, something done primarily for 
the sake of self-protection in the face of potentially disturbing cognitive 
tensions. On this view, engaging in justifying oneself goes hand in hand 
with some degree of closedmindedness. People who engage in justifying 
themselves are trying to protect the integrity of their belief systems, to 
avoid internal conflicts and thereby render their mental lives smooth, 
satisfying, and unassailable, even if that means blocking out good  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evidence, reasonable concerns, and the like. All too often, many 
psychologists worry, justifying oneself leads to the intellectual equivalent 
of stopping up one’s ears to new ideas and perspectives until one can 
safely sort out why one is in the right, at least to one’s satisfaction. From 
this point of view, justifying oneself certainly does seem to be a 
regrettable activity. 
While it cannot be denied that justifying oneself can be prompted by self-
serving reasons of this sort, it is far from clear that the activity as a whole 
deserves such general condemnation. I wish to argue, in fact, that the 
activity of justifying oneself in general ought not to be conceptually 
pigeonholed in this way. The analysis I defend below certainly makes 
room for unfortunate instances of justifying oneself, but it does not limit 
itself to them. !
3. Justifying oneself !
Justifying oneself is the act of defending, verbally, in writing, or in 
thought, the actions, values, goals, attitudes, dispositions, loyalties, 
intuitions, and the like (henceforth ‘commitments’) that one holds as part 
of one’s identity in response to an external or internal challenge, in the 
hopes, at best, of bringing the challenger to accept the commitments they 
have challenged, or, at the least, of resulting in a conviction in the one 
justifying that the demands of justification have been met and hence that 
no further justification is necessary. Eight aspects of this analysis require 
further comment. In what follows, ‘justifying oneself’ should be 
understood as shorthand for ‘the act of justifying oneself’. 
(1) Notice first that justifying oneself encompasses attempts to justify a 
person’s commitments in the broadest sense, not only the person’s 
personality. While justifying oneself may seem to relate only to general 
attacks on one’s character and the like, this is too narrow. Our 
commitments are parts of who we are. When we defend parts of 
ourselves that are sincerely bound up in our identities – our ideas, 
suggestions, values, attitudes, actions, nonactions, interpretations, traits, 
thoughts, policies, goals, and so on – we are justifying ourselves. 
(2) Justifying oneself is primarily an act of defense. This is important 
insofar as it establishes that justifying oneself conceptually requires a 
prior moment of challenge. Yet the challenge shouldn’t necessarily be 
conceived as an attack. Although some challenges are robust or offensive 
enough to warrant that description, many challenges are little more than 
passing doubts or friendly questions that potentially call for a justificatory 
response. 
(3) Contrary to the dominant view amongst psychologists, the act of 
defense that characterizes justifying oneself needn’t be motivated by the 
desire to protect the integrity of one’s belief system. Justifying oneself  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needn’t always be blindly or closedmindedly self-protective. The 
resistance constitutive of justifying oneself may just as easily be 
motivated by the correct conviction that one has excellent reasons to have 
the commitments one has. In short, justifying oneself can be and often is 
prompted by a correct commitment to reason rather than by a desire to 
protect oneself at all costs in order to avoid cognitive dissonance. 
(4) In a similar vein, justifying oneself does not imply closedmindedness. 
It may be thought that justifying oneself implies that the one engaging in 
it has already made up her mind on the issue. After all, why would one 
justify one’s commitments unless one thought that those commitments 
are correct or appropriate? But while some cases of justifying oneself 
may involve closedmindedness, it is not difficult to imagine cases in 
which a person engages in justifying oneself but remains open to the 
possibility that he is mistaken. People often claim to have beliefs but be 
humble about them. While some people merely say this but don’t mean it, 
many people say it and mean it. Many cases of justifying oneself can thus 
be viewed as provisional in the sense that the one engaging in the 
justification thinks that it is warranted at the time or is at least committed 
to pushing the warrant at the moment of justification, but remains open to 
the possibility that counterevidence might lead one to a change of mind, 
possibly even soon after providing the justification. Reflection on 
everyday experience suggests that this is not at all uncommon. 
(5) Justifying oneself only takes place in response to challenges to our 
sincerely-held commitments. By this I mean commitments that we 
consider important in some way for our identity or person, commitments 
that are typically bound up with emotional attachments and the threat of 
personal loss of some kind. Challenges that do not touch a ‘self’-nerve in 
this way might call for response of some kind, but it is misleading to 
characterize them as acts of justifying oneself. If I suggest that we should 
paint the wall blue, but I don’t really care, and you say that we should 
paint it green, I am not thereby pulled into an act of justifying myself; I 
can shrug and agree without any feeling of personal loss. If, however, I 
am sincerely attached to the idea of painting the wall blue, for whatever 
reason, and you challenge this idea, then justifying myself is on the table 
again. Obviously there will be grey areas when it comes to distinguishing 
between challenges that do not call for justifying oneself and those that 
do, but I will not attempt to defend criteria by which such muddy cases 
can be adjudicated. 
(6) A challenge needn’t be given by an external source. It could be 
provided by oneself and for oneself in the course of reflecting upon one’s 
commitments. Moreover, in cases of internal critique, the challenge 
needn’t be consciously formulated. On the plausible assumption, which I 
will not defend here, that subconscious challenges exist and influence us, 
it is possible that a person may feel compelled to justify her commitments 
to herself out of an inchoate apprehension that they stand in need of  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further support or validation. 
(7) As mentioned, an act of justifying oneself has a purpose: at best, to 
bring the challenger to accept the challenged commitments, or, at the 
least, to bring the one attempting the justification to the belief that the 
challenged commitments have been defended well enough such that no 
further justification is necessary. The latter goal is in some ways the more 
primary; for even if a person engaged in justifying herself fails to 
convince her objector, she will have successfully performed an act of 
justifying herself if she considers her defense to have been adequate. 
Justifying oneself thus inherently involves providing a defensive response 
to a challenge of some kind in the hope of establishing, for oneself or 
others, that one’s commitments are acceptable in some sense. This is why 
there are close relations between justifying oneself and the feeling in the 
one challenged of vindication – the feeling of, ‘on the contrary, this is 
acceptable!’ 
The word ‘acceptable’ may strike some as unhelpfully imprecise, but I 
have chosen it with care for the reason that one may engage in justifying 
oneself with the goal of eliciting a variety of different reactions of 
acceptance from one’s challenger. These reactions can be viewed as lying 
on a spectrum characterized by differing levels of acceptability. Starting 
from the highest levels and working downwards, the scale would look 







No worse than anything else 
Not entirely daft 
The hoped-for level of acceptance in any given situation will depend 
upon the particulars of the situation. If I am defending a paper at a 
conference and one of my arguments is challenged, I may attempt to 
justify my commitments with such strength and clarity that my objector 
comes to realize that his challenge was entirely inadequate for some 
reason, such as failing to note a caveat I had made, failing to see a 
relation of implication, failing to see that his argument is based upon 
false premises, and the like. In this case, assuming my defense is sound, 
my objector may withdraw his objection and judge my justification to be 
faultless or excellent. A student justifying her decision to go to Panama 
City for spring break in response to his parents’ worries about his safety 
would likely not expect such success; he might hope to justify his  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decision in such a way that his parents find his justification good or 
reasonable or satisfactory or perhaps simply tolerable. A president called 
by a leader of the political opposition to defend her foreign policy 
decisions on the grounds that they will lead to catastrophe may, in her act 
of justification, only hope to establish in her objector’s mind, or in her 
own, if she still entertains doubts, that the policy is no worse than any 
other feasible policy, or that the policy, even if imperfect in some ways, is 
not entirely daft.  6
(8) Note that the kind of acceptance discussed above is not to be 
understood as necessarily satisfying epistemic desiderata. The goal of 
epistemic justification is truth, and epistemic demands may be satisfied 
without any psychological acceptance taking place. Successful 
justification of oneself as here conceived amounts to a form of 
psychological closure: even if only for the moment, the challenger is 
silenced or, at the very least, the one justifying oneself is satisfied that the 
demands of justification have been met. Unfortunately, from an epistemic 
point of view at least, this can happen with or without rational reasons in 
support of that experience of closure. Successful attempts to justify 
oneself, in the broad sense under discussion here, can thus include or not 
include actual epistemic success. For this reason, an act of justifying 
oneself should not only be conceived as giving a well-structured 
argument with supporting evidence in response to a challenge. There are 
many ways to attempt to defend a commitment, some of which have 
better rational credentials than others, but all of which can function to put 
lingering doubts to rest, if only for a time, in order to achieve the desired 
acceptance. Well-structured arguments can certainly play this role, but 
explanations, clarifications, consideration of new or extenuating factors, 
and even rhetorical tricks can be employed in the service of this end. 
Thus we can say in one case that although someone justified a belief to 
her satisfaction in the sense discussed above, her justification was not in 
fact rational; but we could just as well say in another case that someone 
not only justified a belief to his or another’s satisfaction, but did so in a 
way that satisfies rational desiderata as well.  7!
4. Relation to associated theoretical issues !
(1) Justifying oneself as understood here is entirely normatively neutral 
regarding the content that it seeks to justify. There are no normative 
constraints upon the objects of justification. This is why some cases of  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justifying oneself will be quite faultless in all normative, epistemic, or 
logical respects. Other cases will involve error in one or more of these 
respects. 
(2) Cases of positive evaluation of oneself without relation to a prior 
moment of challenge do not count as justifying oneself. If, absent any 
form of challenge to one of my commitments, I reflect upon it and find it 
good in some way, I am not engaged in an act of justifying myself. When 
I reflectively review and applaud my commitments without prior 
prompting by any kind of challenge, I could be said to be instead engaged 
in an act of endorsement. Unlike justifying oneself, endorsement without 
prior challenge is entirely coherent. Obviously there are muddy waters 
here. Are we sure that there are no lurking subconscious challenge-
prompts? Are we sure that we are not reflectively reviewing our 
commitments because of a now-forgotten challenge sourced in a past 
conversation or reading? Often it will be hard or even impossible to tell. 
But on the assumption that no such challenges are present, yet an act of 
endorsement takes place, the endorsement should not be confused with an 
act of justifying oneself. 
(3) Justifying oneself has conceptual similarities to giving excuses, but 
there is at least one important difference. An excuse is given by or on 
behalf of a person in response to a claim of wrongful action or inaction in 
order to abrogate responsibility for that action or inaction. Excuses are 
thus inherently linked to evading or repudiating responsibility for 
something. By contrast, it is entirely possible to justify oneself without 
seeking to annual responsibility for one’s commitments or actions. We 
find a good example of this in Plato’s Crito. 
(4) Justifying oneself has conceptual links to adaptive preferences, but 
they are not identical. Adaptive preferences are preferences for future 
things, where those preferences have been formed in response to 
oppressive or unfavorable past conditions (Elster 1989; Christman 2014; 
Stoljar 2014). Justifying oneself involves justifying existing 
commitments, which need not have been formed by oppressive or 
unfavorable past conditions, but which have been called into question by 
some form of prior challenge. Many cases of justifying oneself are 
entirely appropriate, benign, and reasonable. Many cases of justifying 
oneself have superb rational credentials and take place without the causal 
history distinctive of the formation of adaptive preferences. Of course, 
some cases of justifying oneself are closely related to adaptive preference 
formation. I may be challenged on an adaptively-formed, sincerely held 
commitment and thereby called to engage in an act of justifying myself. 
Yet I can just as well have adaptive preferences that are never challenged, 
or I can have adaptive preferences that are challenged but are not 




(5) Justifying oneself is also conceptually close to wishful thinking. 
Wishful thinking is characterized by forming beliefs and making 
decisions based upon what we would like to be true or false rather than 
upon what evidence or careful argumentation supports. Wishful thinking, 
which constitutes an informal logical fallacy when it is used to defend 
beliefs, may be a way in which to engage in justifying oneself, admittedly 
a poor one from a rational perspective, and perhaps this is not altogether 
uncommon. But it is quite possible to engage in justifying oneself without 
using wishful thinking methods, and it is also possible to engage in 
wishful thinking when forming beliefs or making decisions in a way that 
doesn’t involve justifying oneself. This would happen when there was no 
prior challenge to a person’s sincerely-held commitments, for example. 
Other differences are notable as well. Some cases of justifying oneself 
can be epistemically respectable, whereas justification by wishful 
thinking is always fallacious. And while both justifying oneself and 
wishful thinking can be prompted by a perceived challenge to one’s 
commitments, the threat in the wishful thinking case doesn’t have to be a 
challenge. It could simply be prompted by the unfortunate circumstances 
in which one finds oneself (e.g. the grapes are out of reach). 
(6) We can distinguish among self-justifying acts, habits, and people. 
Self-justifying acts are one-off attempts at justifying oneself. A self-
justifying person is a person who has a regular and wide-ranging habit of 
engaging in self-justifying acts. Self-justifying people needn’t be 
understood as always and everywhere engaging in this activity, only 
regularly and widely. Someone who lacks this habit may certainly engage 
in acts of justifying herself on this or that occasion, provided that such 
acts are not grounded in an entrenched, pervasive disposition.  8
Attempting to provide criteria to underwrite a sharp distinction between 
the two types of person would take us too far afield, and would likely be 
fruitless anyway. 
(7) Robustly self-justifying people have a habit of attempting to justify 
most of their commitments most of the time in response to a wide range 
of perceived challenges, internal and external, imagined and real. Such a 
habit can have both beneficial and harmful effects. Although I will not 
provide arguments for the following claims, I would speculate that the 
likely positive effects of a habit of justifying oneself would include, in 
different circumstances and for different characters, (a) a sense of self-
esteem/self-love/self-worth, (b) a sense of belonging, (c) self-knowledge/
self-awareness, (d) autonomy, (e) self-assurance/self-confidence, (f) 
rightful self-promotion, (g) a sense of contentment, (h) a habit of self-
scrutiny, (i) taking oneself seriously, and (j) taking others’ views 
seriously. The likely negative effects would include, in different  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circumstances and for different characters, (a) closedmindedness/self-
blindness, (b) excessive defensiveness, (c) self-deception, (d) selfishness, 
(e) immorality, (f) excessive self-involvement/self-indulgence/self-
absorption, (g) excessive self-flattery/self-importance/self-promotion, (h) 
unjustified righteousness, (i) deepening of various cognitive biases, (j) 
denial of responsibility, and (k) the precluding of possibilities for growth. !
5. Final comments !
In this paper I have provided a conceptual analysis of a broad and 
normatively content-neutral conception of justifying oneself. The 
conception I have defended balances out the predominantly negative 
conception of justifying oneself employed by most psychologists and 
reopens speculation as to the normative significance of possessing habits 
of justifying oneself. 
A variety of theoretical and normative inquiries relating to this pervasive 
activity might be pursued. Do challenged commitments in fact need to be 
sincerely held in order for a response to be considered a case of justifying 
oneself? Can we draw a line between healthy and unhealthy engagement 
in justifying oneself in response to internal critique, and if so, how? Can 
we speak of ideal forms, or habits, of justifying oneself that cannot be 
fully unpacked in epistemological terms? If so, what do these look like, 
and how might education for that ideal be structured? Are habits of 
justifying oneself in fact reliably correlated with the positive and negative 
effects discussed above? Is it possible to make cateris paribus judgments 
about the general value of the habit of justifying oneself, or are all such 
judgments ultimately a matter for casuistry? I have not been concerned to 
provide answers to these or related questions. My goal has rather been to 
trace the basic conceptual contours of this important and little discussed 
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